References:
References: Weiser, Samuel, Raphael Spreitzer, and Lukas Bodner. “Single trace attack against RSA key generation in Intel SGX SSL.” In Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 575-586. 2018. More
References: Biondo, Andrea, Mauro Conti, Lucas Davi, Tommaso Frassetto, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. “The Guard’s Dilemma: Efficient Code-Reuse Attacks Against Intel {SGX}.” In 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), pp. 1213-1227. 2018. More
References: Van Bulck, Jo, Daniel Moghimi, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lippi, Marina Minkin, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, Berk Sunar, Daniel Gruss, and Frank Piessens. “LVI: Hijacking transient execution through microarchitectural load value injection.” In 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 54-72. IEEE, 2020. More
References: Chen, Guoxing, Sanchuan Chen, Yuan Xiao, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin, and Ten H. Lai. “SgxPectre: Stealing Intel secrets from SGX enclaves via speculative execution.” In 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), pp. 142-157. IEEE, 2019. More
References: Oleksenko, Oleksii, Bohdan Trach, Robert Krahn, Mark Silberstein, and Christof Fetzer. “Varys: Protecting {SGX} enclaves from practical side-channel attacks.” In 2018 {Usenix} Annual Technical Conference ({USENIX}{ATC} 18), pp. 227-240. 2018. More
References: Van Bulck, Jo, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin, Baris Kasikci, Frank Piessens, Mark Silberstein, Thomas F. Wenisch, Yuval Yarom, and Raoul Strackx. “Foreshadow: Extracting the keys to the intel {SGX} kingdom with transient out-of-order execution.” In 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), pp. 991-1008. 2018. More
References: Van Bulck, Jo, Nico Weichbrodt, Rüdiger Kapitza, Frank Piessens, and Raoul Strackx. “Telling your secrets without page faults: Stealthy page table-based attacks on enclaved execution.” In 26th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 17), pp. 1041-1056. 2017. More
Reference: Glamdring @ 2017ATC 1 Glamdring: Automatic Application Partitioning for Intel SGX. USENIX ATC, 2017. ↩
If you could revise
the fundmental principles of
computer system design
to improve security...
... what would you change?